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Is the NPT in Trouble? Setting the Stage for 
the 2015 Review Conference
Hee-Seog Kwon
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime once again faces a serious 
challenge in the run-up to the NPT Review Conference scheduled for April 27 
to May 22, 2015. This can be attributed to the perceived delay in implementation 
of commitments made by the states parties at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. 
Although the 2015 Review Conference is still half a year away, shaky U.S.–Russia 
relations, the armed conflict directly involving the Israelis and Palestinians, and the 
outcome of the U.S. mid-term elections will not be conducive to the review process. 
Both the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states should redouble 
their efforts to narrow their differences on key issues. 
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                        peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
Introduction
The current Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) review cycle that began 
in 2012 will culminate in the 2015 Review Conference in New York which will 
review the operation of the entire Treaty. Now is the time to revisit the NPT. 
Since its entry into force in 1970, the NPT has been, and still remains, the only 
available international legal instrument that aims to achieve the nonproliferation 
of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. Following the use of atomic 
bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, humankind realized that 
the proliferation of this horrific weapon represented the most dangerous peril 
to international peace and security, threatening the total annihilation of human 
life on the planet. The idea of creating an international treaty to regulate the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons was first put forward in the 1950s, when the 
UN General Assembly initiated the discourse based on the individual proposals 
presented by Ireland, Poland, and Sweden. After France and China joined the 
nuclear club with their successful nuclear tests in 1960 and 1964 respectively, the 
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pace of the debate accelerated. Following negotiations on the draft treaty for close 
to 10 years, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted, in 1968, a joint 
draft to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. It was finally adopted 
at the UN General Assembly in June of that year, and came into effect on March 5, 
1970 (UNODA 2014). 
Although it is a short text, the scope of the Treaty is so broad that all the 
major issues pertaining to the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament 
discourse today are legally connected to its following 11 articles: 
• Article I (nonproliferation obligations of the nuclear-weapon states); 
• Article II (nonproliferation obligations of the non-nuclear-weapon states); 
• Article III (IAEA safeguards and export controls); 
• Article IV (peaceful uses of nuclear energy); 
• Article V (peaceful nuclear explosions); 
• Article VI (nuclear disarmament); 
• Article VII (security assurances and nuclear-weapon-free zones); 
• Article VIII (review conference); 
• Article IX (universality); 
• Article X (withdrawal and extension); and 
• Article XI (deposit of instrument of ratification). 
As such, for more than forty years, the Treaty has provided a conceptual 
framework essential for understanding and properly addressing a wide range of 
issues that relate to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.  
Delicate Balance and Intrinsic Flaws of the Treaty
Since its inception the NPT has been a cornerstone of the international nuclear 
nonproliferation regime, limiting the number of countries in possession of 
nuclear weapons to a minimum. Despite its title, it includes another very 
important element which obligates the nuclear-weapon states to pursue nuclear 
disarmament. What made this deal possible was a grand bargain between the 
nonproliferation obligations assumed by the non-nuclear-weapon states and 
the disarmament obligations imposed upon the nuclear-weapon states, plus the 
latter’s sharing of nuclear technology for peaceful uses to compensate the former 
for not acquiring nuclear weapons. The Treaty therefore rests upon a delicate 
balance among the three intertwined pillars of nuclear disarmament (Article VI), 
nuclear nonproliferation (Articles I, II, and III), and the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy (Article IV). If one pillar is not implemented, this can have a negative 
impact on the other pillars (Goldblat 1990; Thayer 1995). 
The Treaty, however, exhibits intrinsic flaws emanating from the dual nature 
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of nuclear technology. Peaceful nuclear activities may ultimately be diverted for 
military purposes, depending on the intent of the users. In the real world, a state 
party to the NPT would be free to pursue the most sensitive parts of the nuclear 
fuel cycle (enrichment and reprocessing) under the pretext of the peaceful use 
of nuclear technology guaranteed in Article IV, as long as the activities remained 
under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The party could 
then acquire nuclear material and technology necessary to manufacture a nuclear 
device, decide to withdraw from the Treaty in conformity with Article X, and 
finally break out. And nothing in this process would be illegal. In view of this, a 
group of fuel-cycle countries have been taking the lead in closing the loopholes in 
and outside of the IAEA (Sauer 2006; Preez 2006).  
Article VI on nuclear disarmament is another crucial area which has been 
the subject of different interpretations and disputes. This provision mandates 
that “each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in 
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race 
at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and 
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” No clear 
disarmament timeline was set for the nuclear-weapon states, and no monitoring 
institutions or mechanisms were put in place. This ambiguity has been the source 
of an imbalance in the obligations between the nuclear haves and have-nots, and 
exposes the fundamental difference between the two sides in their interpretation 
of, and positions on, Article VI (Kwon 2005). 
Modus Operandi of the Review Cycle
The NPT stood at a crossroads at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference 
when the states parties had to decide whether to extend the Treaty indefinitely 
or only for an additional fixed period(s) pursuant to Article X (2). A final 
compromise was reached whereby the indefinite extension of the Treaty was 
agreed on a quid pro quo basis: The nuclear-weapon states committed to the 
full implementation of their disarmament obligations and of the Middle East 
Resolution that was adopted at the same conference while the non-nuclear 
weapon states agreed to extend the Treaty. In a separate decision on “Strengthening 
the Review Process for the Treaty,” it was agreed that a preparatory meeting would 
be held every year for the three years leading up to each Review Conference. 
The discussions in the preparatory meetings and the Review Conferences 
are conducted on the basis of the three pillars of the NPT—nuclear disarmament, 
nuclear nonproliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The 
various subjects relating to each of the three pillars are assigned to three 
Main Committees to be established under the authority of each Chairperson. 
Traditionally nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation issues are addressed 
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in Main Committee I, safeguards and other nonproliferation issues in Main 
Committee II, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Main Committee III. 
As the Review Conference seeks to assess the operation of the entire Treaty, every 
provision is allocated among the Main Committees for their review. The specific 
mandates of each respective Committee are allocated as follows (UN 2005a):
•  Main Committee I: nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, 
security assurances
•  Main Committee II: safeguards, export controls, nuclear-weapon-free 
zones, regional issues
•  Main Committee III: peaceful uses of nuclear energy, withdrawal, 
institutionalization 
To deepen the discussions on certain issues of interest to the majority of the 
parties, three subsidiary bodies have been formed under each Main Committee 
and the outcome of debates at each of these bodies is reported to the parent Main 
Committee. Subsidiary Body I discusses and identifies new, practical measures 
relating to nuclear disarmament. Subsidiary Body II covers regional issues, 
including the Middle East. Subsidiary Body III deals with the withdrawal from, 
and the institutionalization of, the NPT. This practice has been firmly established 
over the past decade (ibid.). 
These are the issues that, if not properly addressed, could hinder progress 
in the full implementation of the Treaty and possibly even derail the Review 
Conference. In fact, all of these issues have been and will remain, for a 
considerable time, the fault lines that crisscross the interests of various parties 
or groups of parties in the NPT process. Of the specific issues that remain 
contentious between the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon 
states, the most important obstacles continue to be nuclear disarmament and the 
Middle East (Collina, Garrison, and Horner 2014). 
Taking Stock of the 2010 Final Document
For over a decade intermittent progress has been made in the review process. 
It produced as a major achievement the 13 practical steps toward nuclear 
disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. After a failure to reach 
an agreement in 2005 (Kittrie 2007), at the 2010 Review Conference the Final 
Document was adopted by consensus; it included 64 action plans across the three 
pillars of the Treaty and several practical steps leading to the full implementation 
of the 1995 Middle East Resolution (UN 2010). The 2010 Review Conference 
met in the midst of a much changed environment in which the new Obama 
Administration had adopted a moderate nuclear weapons policy and the U.S.-
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Russian reset of relations had culminated in the New Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty (START) just prior to the Review Conference, thus contributing to the 
success of the meeting (Johnson 2009). 
The Final Document consists of both the substantive part (Part I) and the 
procedural part (Part II), and its key elements lie in Part I. The parties at the 
Review Conference have reviewed and assessed the operation and the status of 
implementation of each provision of the Treaty (“review part”), and explored 
possible future steps (“forward-looking part”). These were captured in Part I. 
As in previous meetings, the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-
weapon states encountered difficulties coming to terms with each other and 
voiced different views in reviewing the implementation of nuclear disarmament 
and nonproliferation obligations. As a result, they could only reach a solution by 
adding a footnote in the first page of the document, stating: “The present review 
is the responsibility of the President and reflects to the best of his knowledge what 
transpired at the Review Conference with regard to matters under review” (UN 
2010, 2). 
In the forward-looking part, both sides agreed upon the proposed 64 
actions and other measures relating to the Middle East, which made possible the 
adoption of the Final Document by including the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 
and the Arab states. In addition, the nuclear-weapon states were to “promptly 
engage with” the various practical disarmament measures and submit reports 
to the preparatory meeting in 2014. They further agreed that “the 2015 Review 
Conference will take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation 
of Article VI” (ibid., 19-31). Although the disarmament language was watered 
down to include merely “having consultations” on disarmament among the 
nuclear-weapon states, the document may be considered a success as it secured a 
real commitment to actions by these states.
The nuclear-weapon states—the United States in particular—made 
concessions on the Middle East issue, but were able to soften into general and 
vague terms the disarmament demands from the non-nuclear-weapon states. 
Furthermore, they succeeded in obtaining the agreement of the non-nuclear-
weapon states to incorporate reference to the issues that were their highest 
priorities, such as the recognition of the significance of the Additional Protocol, 
multilateral nuclear export controls, and continuing the discussions on the 
assurances of nuclear fuel supply (ibid., 25-26, 28). 
Major Points of Contention
The nuclear-weapon states have every reason to preserve the NPT in its current 
form as it provides them with unique leverage. As it is, the Treaty recognizes the 
possession of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear-weapon states and encourages 
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their nuclear disarmament within only an unspecified time frame, and at the 
same time it halts the proliferation of nuclear weapons among the vast majority of 
non-nuclear-weapon states. As long as it remains in effect, the Treaty could help 
prevent all the non-nuclear-weapon states from developing nuclear weapons. 
Within the NPT process, the nuclear-weapon states have shown a rare instance 
of close coordination and collaboration in defense of their common position 
(Mukhatzhanova 2014).
The non-nuclear-weapon states gave up the option of terminating the 
Treaty in 1995, which they had criticized as unfair and unbalanced in the rights 
and obligations between the nuclear haves and the nuclear have-nots. They 
determined that, unfair as it was, the Treaty had been able to stop the further 
spread of the horrific weapons among the nations of the world. As such, the 
Treaty was broadly in their own interest. With this stance, however, they lost 
the leverage to put pressure on the nuclear-weapon states for the immediate 
implementation of their nuclear disarmament obligations in Article VI. When 
they are truly frustrated with the slow pace of the disarmament process, or the 
implementation of the Middle East Resolution, the non-nuclear-weapon states 
can now only threaten to withdraw from the Treaty in the individual exercise of 
their right under Article X. On balance, then, the nuclear-weapon states have a 
stronger interest in terms of security benefits to conserve the Treaty than the non-
nuclear-weapon states. 
Not all of the previous eight Review Conferences have adopted a final 
outcome document. Although the document was often seen as a measure of the 
success or failure of the Review Conference, the absence of a final document 
has not seriously undermined the fate of the Treaty. If the discussions, albeit 
acrimonious, have been rich and in-depth on the main issues, the Review 
Conference has been considered successful. Against this backdrop, let us now 
turn to the two major debates in the NPT review process that will continue to be 
the most contentious at the next Review Conference in 2015.       
Nuclear Disarmament 
Positions of Fundamental Difference
In the discourse on nuclear disarmament, the five nuclear-weapon states 
comprise a minority compared to the majority of non-nuclear-weapon states. As 
the nuclear-dependent (but non-nuclear-weapon) states—those in The North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the bilateral alliance systems—may 
take an ambivalent approach to the issue, the nuclear-weapon states are under 
heavy pressure from the Non-Aligned Movement, the New Agenda Coalition 
(NAC), and other groups and individual states that are strongly committed to 
nuclear disarmament. The non-nuclear-weapon states have voiced the criticism 
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that the nuclear-weapon states have not fully implemented the disarmament 
obligations set forth in Article VI. They point out that many decades after the 
NPT came into force more than enough nuclear weapons to annihilate humanity 
several times over still remain in the hands of nuclear-weapon states. They have 
strongly demanded the setting of a nuclear disarmament timeline, the start of the 
negotiations on the elimination of nuclear weapons, and the establishment of a 
verification mechanism for nuclear disarmament (UN 2005a; 2005b; Sagan and 
Waltz 1995).
In response, the nuclear-weapon states have reaffirmed their commitment to 
implementing Article VI. However, they have stated that as long as the prevailing 
international security environment remains volatile and precarious, with diverse 
security threats, nuclear weapons are for the time being indispensable. Instead, 
they have expressed concerns about nuclear proliferation activities by non-
nuclear-weapon states such as Iran and North Korea, maintaining that they 
represent a hindrance to disarmament progress. They have highlighted the 
importance of strengthening nonproliferation measures and have insisted that 
the non-nuclear-weapon states should abide by their nonproliferation obligations 
under Articles II and III (Muller 2006; Pfaltzgraff 2006; Granoff 2007). These 
states share collective responsibility that prevents any of them from breaking 
rank. Thus, they hold that nuclear disarmament and elimination cannot be 
achieved overnight, and should proceed in a gradual, incremental, step-by-step 
and phased manner, in tandem with improvements in the international security 
situation. Likewise, no country can set an artificial timeline for the elimination 
of nuclear weapons. Rather, the non-nuclear-weapon states should propose 
practical, realistic steps instead of ones that cannot be implemented (Kwon 2010a; 
2010b; Thakur, Boulden, and Weiss 2008).
Considering the substance of these conflicting arguments from the two sides, 
the difference is real and fundamental. It fosters mutual distrust and does not 
contribute to the amicable atmosphere in the Review Conference necessary for 
producing a consensus document. The discourse on this subject has recently been 
replayed at the third preparatory meeting for the 2015 Review Conference, held in 
New York from April 28 to May 9, 2014. The session that was mandated to make 
every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the 
Review Conference failed to do so. The nuclear-weapon states complained that 
the text on nuclear disarmament had drifted away from the 2010 wording they 
had agreed to, while the non-nuclear-weapon states called for the strengthening 
of the disarmament language. The Chair, Ambassador Enrique Román-Morey of 
Peru, decided to convey the recommendations to the Review Conference in the 
form of a working paper under his own authority, which, unfortunately, has been 
an established practice in previous preparatory meetings (UN 2014a; 2014b).
The progress made in implementing disarmament actions contained in the 
2010 Final Document lags behind expectations. According to the NPT Action 
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Plan Monitoring Report circulated by a dedicated NGO (Reaching Critical Will 
2014), as of March 2014, out of the 22 actions agreed to in the Final Document, 
no progress was made on 11, limited progress was achieved on six, and forward 
movement was seen in only five. Given the positions of the nuclear-weapon 
states at the recent preparatory meeting and the limited time remaining before 
the Review Conference next year, there are weak grounds for expecting much 
further progress in the implementation of disarmament actions.
Meanwhile, the five NPT nuclear-weapon states, as required by the 2010 
document, have submitted to the third preparatory meeting their reports 
on implementation of Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan.1 Despite their 
declaratory policies and some tangible steps on nuclear disarmament as 
detailed in these reports, it seems that they have placed primary emphasis on 
nonproliferation and verification as well as the promotion of transparency 
through reporting, which could tend to divert attention from their urgent 
obligation of nuclear disarmament (Collina 2014).
Humanitarian Imperative
At the 2010 Review Conference participants shared their profound concern 
regarding the humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear weapons. This issue has 
had the potential to upset the dynamics of the disarmament discourse in the NPT 
process. The non-nuclear-weapon states, having long witnessed the slow pace 
of nuclear disarmament undertaken by the nuclear-weapon states, began to see 
the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapon use as an imperative to move 
forward towards a world free of nuclear weapons. By emphasizing the horrendous 
human suffering inflicted by nuclear weapons, they wished to galvanize the 
human conscience and mobilize the political will for negotiations on a treaty 
outlawing and banning nuclear weapons (Helfand 2013).
To that end, two meetings were held among like-minded countries outside 
of the NPT process. The Government of Norway hosted a conference in Oslo, 
in March 2013, on the humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear weapons. 
And Mexico hosted the second meeting in Nayarit in February 2014 (Kimball 
2014). The Austrian Government has announced that the third meeting of this 
kind will be held in Vienna in December 2014. These conferences have served 
as a reminder to government officials and the public of the horrific destruction 
which can be caused by the use of nuclear weapons and sought to reveal the 
insanity of continuing to possess and modernize nuclear weapons. In line with 
this, 16 governments issued a joint statement at the 2012 preparatory meeting 
highlighting the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapon use 
and calling on all states to intensify their efforts to outlaw and eliminate these 
weapons (UN 2012). This call was echoed by 35 governments at the subsequent 
UN General Assembly First Committee session, held on October 22, 2012.
Moreover, 80 countries at the 2013 preparatory meeting expressed “deep 
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concern” at the unacceptable harm caused by and the indiscriminate nature 
of these weapons (UN 2013). At the subsequent meeting of the UN General 
Assembly First Committee, 125 states signed a statement that expressed their deep 
concern about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. Also, the First 
Committee adopted a resolution with the support of 129 countries calling for the 
urgent start of multilateral negotiations for the elimination of nuclear weapons. 
At the 2014 preparatory meeting, almost all speakers emphasized their concerns 
with the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon states are 
keeping their distance from these meetings, suspicious that the discussions on 
the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons may lead to negotiations for a treaty 
outside the NPT framework banning nuclear weapons. Fresh in their minds 
are previous instances in which like-minded countries, frustrated at the lack of 
progress in the moribund disarmament negotiations, have come together outside 
of the multilateral bodies to separately negotiate and conclude a treaty banning 
landmines, cluster munitions, and other such scourges. 
International Security Environment
Long a subject of intense debate, the Iranian nuclear issue has been on the 
negotiating table for many years (Kwon 2003) and momentum is currently 
building to address this. If this matter is successfully concluded at the ongoing 
nuclear negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran well before the extended deadline 
of July 1, 2015, the longstanding issue of noncompliance with nonproliferation 
obligations by Iran will be effectively resolved. This will give some breathing 
space to the nuclear-weapon states, and have a positive effect on the Review 
Conference. On the other hand, the evolving Ukrainian crisis will lead to the 
even greater widening of the already yawning divide between the United States 
and Russia. It would be very difficult to expect any serious nuclear reduction 
negotiations between the two sides within the remaining timeframe before the 
2015 Review Conference. Domestically in the United States, the November 4 
mid-term elections have resulted in a Republican-dominated Senate and House 
of Representatives that seriously weakens the position of the United States 
for playing a proactive role on disarmament issues. Overall, the international 
security environment faced at the time of the 2015 Review Conference may not 
be as favorable as in 2010, when President Obama had already reengaged with 
multilateral disarmament efforts and had delivered the 2009 Prague speech on his 
vision for achieving a world without nuclear weapons. 
Middle East WMD-Free Zone
At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the non-nuclear-weapon 
states agreed to the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the premise that the 
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nuclear-weapon states would pursue nuclear disarmament and implement the 
Middle East resolution adopted at the same Conference. The overarching purpose 
of the resolution was to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. 
As time went on, the concept evolved to encompass all types of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. The failure to implement the 
terms of the resolution would therefore be a recipe for the demise of the Treaty, at 
least in the eyes of the Arab states and their supporters in NAM (Feldman 1997).
The 22 Arab states are the hardcore subgroup of NAM. Their unique 
solidarity is unparalleled in any other group, as demonstrated not only in the 
NPT process but also in other forums such as the IAEA, the Conference on 
Disarmament, the Human Rights Council, and the UN General Assembly and its 
First Committee. The group garners broad support from NAM and others that 
place great importance on the Arab cause for Palestinian liberation and their own 
security in the Middle East.
The member states of the Arab League have been relentless in their pursuit 
of the objective of constraining the Israeli capabilities to possess nuclear weapons. 
Toward that end, they have long demanded the establishment of a WMD-free 
zone in the Middle East. In such a scenario, Israel, an NPT holdout, would be 
required to renounce any nuclear weapons in its possession and all of its nuclear 
materials and technology would be placed under IAEA scrutiny. In response to 
this Israel has contended that, in the absence of peace and stability in the region, 
it will not agree to a Middle East WMD-free zone, and any discussion of the 
subject should encompass the regional security and confidence-building issues 
facing Israel. But this approach has been rejected by the Arab countries.
After much delay in implementing the Middle East resolution, a breakthrough 
was made at the 2010 Review Conference which adopted concrete steps in the 
Final Document for implementation of the 1995 resolution. The document 
reaffirmed that “the resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are 
achieved,” and endorsed several practical steps for the full implementation of the 
resolution to be undertaken by the UN Secretary-General and the co-sponsors 
of the resolution (Russia, the UK, and the United States) (UN 2010; Kwon 
2010b). These steps were, inter alia: (1) convening a conference in 2012, to be 
attended by all states of the Middle East, on the establishment of a WMD-free 
zone in the Middle East; (2) appointing a facilitator with a mandate to support 
the implementation of the 1995 resolution by conducting consultations with 
the regional states and undertaking preparations for the convening of the 2012 
conference; and (3) designating a host government for the 2012 conference.
Although in 2011 Mr. Jaakko Laajava, Undersecretary of State for Foreign 
and Security Policy of Finland, was appointed as the Facilitator and Finland 
was designated as the host government, the conference on the establishment of 
a Middle East WMD-free zone has yet to be held, and no date has been fixed, 
leading to growing pessimism among the parties to the NPT with regard to the 
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prospects for the 2015 Review Conference (UN 2014b).
The failure to hold the Middle East conference in 2012 led to a fiasco at the 
subsequent preparatory meeting held in April 2013. The Egyptian delegation 
walked out in protest at the failure to achieve the timely holding of the 
conference. Since this incident has overshadowed the current review cycle, major 
efforts have been exerted to rescue the process for convening of the conference. 
With the facilitator’s intervention, the key players in the Middle East, including 
Israel, finally met face-to-face in Glion, Switzerland, in three rounds of meetings, 
in October and November 2013, and February 2014, with a view to finding a 
way forward, but to no avail. These efforts will continue in the run-up to the 
2015 Review Conference. However, given that the armed conflict flared up again 
during the summer of 2014 between the Israelis and Palestinians and tensions 
remain high, the prospects for the convening of the conference remain dim. The 
issue of holding a conference on a WMD-free zone in the Middle East poses a 
serious challenge to all the parties to the NPT. Failure to convene a conference 
would provide justification for the Arab group and the broader NAM member 
states to reconsider their compliance with the NPT. 
Conclusion
Since its inception 45 years ago, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has 
functioned as a conceptual framework by which the international community 
framed a broad range of issues pertaining to nuclear nonproliferation and 
disarmament. In the absence of the NPT, many more countries today would have 
developed or possessed nuclear weapons. However, the delicate balance among 
the three main pillars of the NPT (nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, 
and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy) and its intrinsic flaws, causing different 
interpretations and disagreements on nuclear disarmament, mean that vigilance 
and constant care on the part of all the states parties to the Treaty are required.
In that sense, the success of the NPT review process is critical to the health 
of the NPT regime. For instance, the successful holding of the 2010 Review 
Conference contributed to the galvanization of the political will to address 
nuclear nonproliferation issues in the IAEA Board of Governors and the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG).2 Various proposals to provide assurances of nuclear 
fuel supply were adopted by the Board in the following years, and the newly 
strengthened criteria for supply of enrichment and reprocessing technology 
was also agreed upon at the NSG Plenary meeting in the Netherlands in 2011. 
Another success at the 2015 Review Conference would serve to foster a more 
amicable and cooperative atmosphere between the nuclear-weapon states and 
the non-nuclear-weapon states across the board on nuclear disarmament and 
nonproliferation issues.
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Yet, if the current impasse over the implementation of disarmament 
obligations and the convening of a conference on the Middle East WMD-free 
zone continues, it is likely that the Review Conference will face great difficulties in 
adopting a consensus document, as was the case in 2010. Furthermore, although 
the holding of the Review Conference is still half a year away, shaky U.S.–Russian 
relations, the armed conflict directly involving the Israelis and Palestinians, and 
the outcome of the November U.S. mid-term elections may not be conducive to 
the review process. Both the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon 
states should therefore redouble their efforts to narrow their differences on key 
issues. 
Notes
The views in this paper do not represent the policies and positions of the Government of 
the Republic of Korea, but are entirely the author’s own.
1. Action 5 of the 2010 Final Document provides that several steps be taken by the 
nuclear-weapon states that would lead to nuclear disarmament, while Actions 20 and 21 
require the submission of regular reports and a standard reporting format.
2. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a group of nuclear supplier countries that 
seeks to contribute to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation 
of two sets of guidelines for nuclear and nuclear-related exports. The guidelines are 
implemented by each Participating Government in accordance with its own national laws 
and practices. Decisions on export applications are taken at the national level in accordance 
with national export licensing requirements. Currently 48 countries are participating in the 
NSG.
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